Facts:
Herein respondents were employees of Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land. They were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as Operations Manager.
Respondents decided to form a union for their mutual aid and protection. However, they were transferred to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas) before they were able to continue the formation of the said union.
Despite such transfer, the schedule of the respondents, as well as their company identification cards, were issued by PTI. Their daily time records, tickets and reports were also filed at the PTI office. Likewise, all their claims for salaries were transacted at the same office.
Later, the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment.
Respondents consequently filed a complaint charging petitioners with illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and illegal deductions and praying for the award of premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service leave pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that respondents were no longer their employees, since they all transferred to Lubas at their own request. Petitioners had nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees. Petitioners were not aware of the existence of any union in their company and came to know of the same only in June 1998 when they were served a copy of the summons in the petition for certification election filed by the union. That before the union was registered, the complaint was already filed. The real motive in the filing of the complaints was because PTI asked respondents to vacate the bunkhouse where the respondents and their respective families were staying because PTI wanted to renovate the same.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners were not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that they violated respondents’ right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter also held that Lubas is the respondents’ employer and that it (Lubas) is an entity which is separate, distinct and independent from PTI. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter found that Lubas is guilty of illegally dismissing respondents from their employment.
Respondents filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying, among others, that PTI should also be held equally liable as Lubas.
Here, the NLRC sustained the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC.
The CA ruled that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere instrumentality, agent conduit or adjunct of PTI; and that petitioners’ act of transferring respondents’ employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of respondents to organize themselves into a union.
Petitioners went to the Supreme Court (SC) and filed a petition for review on certiorari. They argued that the CA should have respected the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC; that it should not have given due course to the petition for certiorari with respect to several respondents who failed to file an appeal to the NLRC and considering that only one of the respondents executed and verified the said petition; that Petitioners Prince Transport, Inc. and Mr. Renato Claros, and Lubas Transport are separate and distinct entities; and that reinstatement should not have been awarded as it was not one of the issues raised in their petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Does the CA have the power to resolve factual issues?
2. Does it have the power to conduct its own evaluation of the evidence on record despite the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC?
3. Did the petition for certiorari suffer from a fatal defect considering that its verification and certification against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia?
4. Did the CA err in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with respect to Lubas?
5. Did the CA err in awarding reinstatement to respondents?
6. Did petitioners commit unfair labor practice?
Ruling:
1. The CA has the power to resolve factual issues. Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
2. The CA has the power to conduct its own evaluation of evidence despite the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. When there is a showing that the findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the CA. The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC. In this case, the SC ruled that the CA did not err in arriving at the following factual findings and conclusions.
3. Firstly, respondents' petition did not suffer from a fatal defect when its verification and certification against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia.
While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. In a number of cases, it has been consistently held that when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. In the present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action. Hence, the signature of respondent Garcia is a sufficient compliance with the rule governing certificates of non-forum shopping. In the first place, some of the respondents actually executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Garcia as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.
With respect to the absence of some of the workers’ signatures in the verification, the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when some of the parties who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Moreover, respondents' Partial Appeal shows that the appeal stipulated as complainants-appellants, meaning that there were more than one appellant who were all workers of petitioners. In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified, may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. Indeed, the absence of a verification is not jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on a case. Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the verification attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC is not fatal to their cause of action.
4. Secondly, the CA did not err in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with respect to Lubas.
Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same. It may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. However, petitioners’ attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy. In the present case it was Prince Transport who made the decision to transfer its employees to Lubas. Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity, as it admits to having referred to said entity as “Lubas operations.” Moreover, it admits that it did not transfer the employees for it “assigned” the respondents. Lastly, the existing funds and 201 file of the employees were turned over not to a new company but a “new management.” PTI even exercised the decision as to which employees shall work in Lubas. What is telling is the fact that PTI admitted that Lubas is one of its sub-companies. In addition, PTI, in its letters to its employees who were transferred to Lubas, referred to the latter as its “New City Operations Bus.” Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latter’s transfer to Lubas of their daily time records, reports, daily income remittances of conductors, schedule of drivers and conductors were all made, performed, filed and kept at the office of PTI. In fact, respondents’ identification cards bear the name of PTI.
5. Thirdly, the CA did not err in awarding reinstatement to respondents.
It is clear from the amended complaints filed by respondents that they are seeking reinstatement. In any case, Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. Moreover, the general prayer is broad enough “to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought.” Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. In the instant case, aside from their specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs which are deemed just and equitable.
6. Lastly, petitioners in this case have committed unfair labor practice.
Respondents’ transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former’s right to organize themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. In this case, after respondents' transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. Petitioners “withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition.” This left respondents virtually jobless.
Continue reading "Prince Transport Inc v. Garcia, G.R. No. 167291, January 12 2011 [DIGEST]"
Herein respondents were employees of Prince Transport, Inc. (PTI), a company engaged in the business of transporting passengers by land. They were hired either as drivers, conductors, mechanics or inspectors, except for respondent Diosdado Garcia (Garcia), who was assigned as Operations Manager.
Respondents decided to form a union for their mutual aid and protection. However, they were transferred to one of its sub-companies, Lubas Transport (Lubas) before they were able to continue the formation of the said union.
Despite such transfer, the schedule of the respondents, as well as their company identification cards, were issued by PTI. Their daily time records, tickets and reports were also filed at the PTI office. Likewise, all their claims for salaries were transacted at the same office.
Later, the business of Lubas deteriorated because of the refusal of PTI to maintain and repair the units being used therein, which resulted in the virtual stoppage of its operations and respondents' loss of employment.
Respondents consequently filed a complaint charging petitioners with illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and illegal deductions and praying for the award of premium pay for holiday and rest day, holiday pay, service leave pay, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that respondents were no longer their employees, since they all transferred to Lubas at their own request. Petitioners had nothing to do with the management and operations of Lubas as well as the control and supervision of the latter's employees. Petitioners were not aware of the existence of any union in their company and came to know of the same only in June 1998 when they were served a copy of the summons in the petition for certification election filed by the union. That before the union was registered, the complaint was already filed. The real motive in the filing of the complaints was because PTI asked respondents to vacate the bunkhouse where the respondents and their respective families were staying because PTI wanted to renovate the same.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioners were not guilty of unfair labor practice in the absence of evidence to show that they violated respondents’ right to self-organization. The Labor Arbiter also held that Lubas is the respondents’ employer and that it (Lubas) is an entity which is separate, distinct and independent from PTI. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter found that Lubas is guilty of illegally dismissing respondents from their employment.
Respondents filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) praying, among others, that PTI should also be held equally liable as Lubas.
Here, the NLRC sustained the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Decision and Resolution of the NLRC.
The CA ruled that petitioners were guilty of unfair labor practice; that Lubas is a mere instrumentality, agent conduit or adjunct of PTI; and that petitioners’ act of transferring respondents’ employment to Lubas is indicative of their intent to frustrate the efforts of respondents to organize themselves into a union.
Petitioners went to the Supreme Court (SC) and filed a petition for review on certiorari. They argued that the CA should have respected the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC; that it should not have given due course to the petition for certiorari with respect to several respondents who failed to file an appeal to the NLRC and considering that only one of the respondents executed and verified the said petition; that Petitioners Prince Transport, Inc. and Mr. Renato Claros, and Lubas Transport are separate and distinct entities; and that reinstatement should not have been awarded as it was not one of the issues raised in their petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Does the CA have the power to resolve factual issues?
2. Does it have the power to conduct its own evaluation of the evidence on record despite the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC?
3. Did the petition for certiorari suffer from a fatal defect considering that its verification and certification against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia?
4. Did the CA err in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with respect to Lubas?
5. Did the CA err in awarding reinstatement to respondents?
6. Did petitioners commit unfair labor practice?
Ruling:
1. The CA has the power to resolve factual issues. Under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902, the CA — pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari — is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues.
2. The CA has the power to conduct its own evaluation of evidence despite the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. When there is a showing that the findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the CA. The CA can grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution, made a factual finding not supported by substantial evidence. It is within the jurisdiction of the CA, whose jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review the findings of the NLRC. In this case, the SC ruled that the CA did not err in arriving at the following factual findings and conclusions.
3. Firstly, respondents' petition did not suffer from a fatal defect when its verification and certification against forum shopping was signed only by respondent Garcia.
While the general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. Strict compliance with the provision regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping underscores its mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, prohibit substantial compliance therewith under justifiable circumstances, considering especially that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. In a number of cases, it has been consistently held that when all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. In the present case, there is no question that respondents share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action. Hence, the signature of respondent Garcia is a sufficient compliance with the rule governing certificates of non-forum shopping. In the first place, some of the respondents actually executed a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Garcia as their attorney-in-fact in filing a petition for certiorari with the CA.
With respect to the absence of some of the workers’ signatures in the verification, the verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when some of the parties who undoubtedly have sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition had signed the same. Such verification is deemed a sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, and not merely speculative. Moreover, respondents' Partial Appeal shows that the appeal stipulated as complainants-appellants, meaning that there were more than one appellant who were all workers of petitioners. In any case, the settled rule is that a pleading which is required by the Rules of Court to be verified, may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice. Indeed, the absence of a verification is not jurisdictional, but only a formal defect, which does not of itself justify a court in refusing to allow and act on a case. Hence, the failure of some of the respondents to sign the verification attached to their Memorandum of Appeal filed with the NLRC is not fatal to their cause of action.
4. Secondly, the CA did not err in applying the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil with respect to Lubas.
Lubas is a mere agent, conduit or adjunct of PTI. A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same. It may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. However, petitioners’ attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy. In the present case it was Prince Transport who made the decision to transfer its employees to Lubas. Prince Transport never regarded Lubas Transport as a separate entity, as it admits to having referred to said entity as “Lubas operations.” Moreover, it admits that it did not transfer the employees for it “assigned” the respondents. Lastly, the existing funds and 201 file of the employees were turned over not to a new company but a “new management.” PTI even exercised the decision as to which employees shall work in Lubas. What is telling is the fact that PTI admitted that Lubas is one of its sub-companies. In addition, PTI, in its letters to its employees who were transferred to Lubas, referred to the latter as its “New City Operations Bus.” Moreover, petitioners failed to refute the contention of respondents that despite the latter’s transfer to Lubas of their daily time records, reports, daily income remittances of conductors, schedule of drivers and conductors were all made, performed, filed and kept at the office of PTI. In fact, respondents’ identification cards bear the name of PTI.
5. Thirdly, the CA did not err in awarding reinstatement to respondents.
It is clear from the amended complaints filed by respondents that they are seeking reinstatement. In any case, Section 2 (c), Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides that a pleading shall specify the relief sought, but may add a general prayer for such further or other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable. Under this rule, a court can grant the relief warranted by the allegation and the proof even if it is not specifically sought by the injured party; the inclusion of a general prayer may justify the grant of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought, if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. Moreover, the general prayer is broad enough “to justify extension of a remedy different from or together with the specific remedy sought.” Even without the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. The court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for.The prayer in the complaint for other reliefs equitable and just in the premises justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. In the instant case, aside from their specific prayer for reinstatement, respondents, in their separate complaints, prayed for such reliefs which are deemed just and equitable.
6. Lastly, petitioners in this case have committed unfair labor practice.
Respondents’ transfer of work assignments to Lubas was designed by petitioners as a subterfuge to foil the former’s right to organize themselves into a union. Under Article 248 (a) and (e) of the Labor Code, an employer is guilty of unfair labor practice if it interferes with, restrains or coerces its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or if it discriminates in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. In this case, after respondents' transfer to Lubas, petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned. Petitioners “withheld the necessary financial and logistic support such as spare parts, and repair and maintenance of the transferred buses until only two units remained in running condition.” This left respondents virtually jobless.
